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here's how ferdinand de saussure, writing slightly earlier, saw the relation between thought and language:
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roland barthes, an interesting theorist who bridges the structuralist/post-structuralist gap in the mid-20th century, used this model:
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another more recent semiotic triangle is extended to include the term 'definition'. this one is from 1997 and is credited to Suonnuuti, who i've never heard of before.
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here's what i guess could be called a post-structuralist semiotic schema. it's greimas' semiotic square. it's not actually about the structure of a symbol, but the structure of a particular opposition within a text. remember, post-structuralism isn't a philosophy per se, it's just a way of handling texts and their meanings.
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and here's an epistemological model of the semiotic triangle that i think tries to explain what an artificial intelligence would have to have in order to understand signs:
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i guess the point is that these kinds of models are very vague. what lines and circles mean is pretty debatable and not even very empirically useful. also, the value of using a little picture to talk about symbols seems dubious at best to me. these kinds of diagrams only make sense when they're responding to one another, or when one philosopher says 'but what if it did work like this...' and uses an illustration to demonstrate their difference from some other tradition. someone should probably launch a study of these kinds of diagrams as a form in the semiotic/linguistic/cognitive fields. maybe someone already has...
6 comments:
also, note that on the original ogden triangle the sides are labeled 'true', 'adequate', and 'correct.'
does this mean that these designations are a function of language? that only the relation between a symbol and object can be 'true'?
something to think about.
I disagree with your general condemnation of using diagrams. I think they are often clearer than words. What's your beef with graphical representations? Is using a visual symbol to describe visual symbolism any more dubious than using words to describe verbal symbolism?
I thought most of the diagrams communicated something interesting--debatable, certainly, but at least interesting. Except for Saussure's. That diagram was total shit.
nope. using symbols to describe symbolism is exactly as dubious as using words to describe language.
interesting, yes. debatable, of course, but to what end?
if we arranged a formal language for use on this blog, we would be committing ourselves to the existence of coherent categories of things like 'concept', 'referent', 'refers to,' just by creating the language and defining our terms.
if we could agree on terms, we wouldn't even have to have the debate at all!
also, to be fair to saussure, his famous diagram (the two part sign business) is a bit more coherent than this one. i picked this one because it IS absurd and demonstrates just how little it takes to create a diagram.
how can anyone debate some squiggles with lines connecting them?
interesting, yes. debatable, of course, but to what end?
A descriptive, predictive (maybe even prescriptive) theory of meaning, of course!
if we arranged a formal language for use on this blog, we would be committing ourselves to the existence of coherent categories of things like 'concept', 'referent', 'refers to,' just by creating the language and defining our terms.
Not so! That's the problem with your whole world of language: acting as if talking in a certain way commits us to anything.
All an agreed-upon notation does is reduce ambiguity. There's no rule against saying "this notation is incoherent." In fact, many times formal notation has been invoked precisely to prove its own limitations.
Anyway, it wasn't a serious suggestion, although one day I may go crazy and formulate one anyway.
But if agreeing on the terms is a problem, let's argue those terms. What I don't understand is why you think that distinctions between symbol, concept, and referent are suspect, because they seem so clear and useful to me. When thinking carefully there is just no ambiguity between the word "tank," actual tanks, and my tank-concept, in my belief system.
how can anyone debate some squiggles with lines connecting them?
(1) By agreeing on an interpretation and then debating what is true about the world,
(2) barring that, by debating the most reasonable interpretation of them.
try looking at Lacan's play on the Saussurian model of S1 over S2 to get really confused.
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